Nicholas Kenney
Nicholas Kenney is a professor of political science at Minerva University and has worked for the US State and Defense Departments.
Since Russia invaded Ukraine, Americans have evoked the Second World War’s lesson that aggression unchecked is aggression unleashed. This knee-jerk analogy ignores a lesson of the First World War that points in the opposite policy direction: an international system of interlocking great power alliances can widen war beyond rationality. Russia in 2022 is less like Nazi Germany in 1933 and more like Austria-Hungary in 1914: imperial, hind-bound, sclerotic, and above all, weak. US foreign policy zeal in further eroding Russia’s great power status risks provoking China to reset the balance of power.
Russia in 2022 bears similarities to Austria-Hungary in 1914 economically, militarily, ideologically, and diplomatically. Austria-Hungary ranked last among the five great powers in overall GDP and was second to last in terms of GDP per capita. Russia’s economy today is eleventh in overall GDP and fifty-third in GDP per capita. Just like Austria-Hungary, Russia’s economy is stagnant and uncompetitive.
Militarily, Austria-Hungary’s army was last among the five great powers. It had a 1.3 million troops compared to Germany’s 2.1 million; also, its military was behind the innovation curve, in failing to develop combined arms doctrines for infantry, artillery, and cavalry. Today, Russia’s military is relatively weak. Russia has 1 million active-duty troops, which is smaller than North Korea’s army. Russia’s qualitative military weakness is also clearly evident from its defeat in the Battle of Kyiv, with its endemic logistical mismanagement, lack of air power, and limited precision-guided weaponry.
Ideologically, Putin shares the same imperial mentality with Emperor Franz Josef. By 1914, Franz Josef was desperate to maintain a dying empire in the face of rising nationalism, democratization, and global capitalism. He was old, ineffectual, bigoted, and out of touch with anti-imperial ideologies. He wanted to return to Austria-Hungary’s glory days of the past when it was a bastion against Ottoman expansionism. So too, Putin wants to return Russia to its imperial past as a bulwark against the West. Both leaders looked back into history for inspiration instead of the future.
Most importantly, Austria-Hungary’s diplomatic position is very similar to Russia’s today. Austria-Hungary depended upon Germany to prop it up in the face of external and internal threats. After the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his beloved Sophie, Duchess of Hohenberg 28 June 1914, Austria sought approval from Berlin to retaliate against Serbia. Germany gave Austria the so-called carte blanche to proceed as it saw fit with the assurance that Germany would support it militarily if stronger parties intervened.
China and Russia’s relationship has a similar dynamic even though it is not a formal alliance. Putin met with Xi Jinping in February 4, 2022; intelligence sources indicate that at this meeting Putin promised not to invade before the Beijing Winter Olympics ended. The two sides then issued a lengthy joint statement, denouncing NATO enlargement and US militarism, clearly indicating that China and Russia view themselves as standing against a common enemy: the US and its allies. This closeness is further supported by the fact that Russia and China signed a 30-year contract for Russian gas from a new pipeline.
Of course, this parallel should not be taken too far since Russia is very different from Austria-Hungary in two major respects: it allegedly has the most nuclear weapons in the world and vast oil and gas reserves. These sources of power, however, should not distract from the likelihood that if the war’s outcome removes China’s only major ally against the West, then China will accelerate a policy of giving Russia the high-tech materials it needs to upgrade its military and the financial support it requires to resist sanctions. The US should begin a dialogue with China over its view of redlines for its alliance with Russia, and it should reassure China that should Putin’s regime fall, the US will not seek to exploit that advantage to threaten China. If the US fails to do these two things, historians might be writing a book called the Guns of August 2022 about the Third World War, and the tragic lesson will be that we failed to remember the lessons of the first.
Sources for fact-checking:
- For data on Austria-Hungary’s economy:
- For data on Russia’s economy
- For data on military in WWI
- Ferguson, Pity of War, p. 92
- https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/tactics_army_austria-hungary
- For data on Russia’s military
- Russia and China 4 Feb. 2022 Head of State meeting and Joint Statement
